Every term of the course in one line, A to Z. In the “See” column, a lecture number (L3, L9, …) links to the lecture section; every other link goes to the term’s concept page. Formulas are on the Formula Sheet.
Names that mean two things
- Situational awareness is a model property (it knows it is an AI in a test or in deployment; see Evaluation Awareness) and the title of Aschenbrenner’s 2024 forecast essay (L13).
- Goodheart (Goodheart Labs, the AGI-timeline dashboard in L13) is not Goodhart’s law (a measure that becomes a target stops being a good measure; see Reward Hacking).
- Watermarking hides an attribution mark that must resist removal; steganography hides a real message that must resist detection (L11).
- Jailbreak: the user attacks the model. Prompt injection: a third party attacks the user’s agent through data (L3).
A
| Term | Meaning | See |
|---|---|---|
| Abliteration | remove the refusal direction from the weights by projection; disables refusal without training | Refusal Direction |
| Adaptive attack | an attack designed for one specific defense; the attacker moves second | Adaptive Attack |
| Adversarial example | a small, targeted perturbation inside a norm ball that makes a model wrong | Adversarial Example |
| Adversarial training | min-max training with PGD in the inner loop | Adversarial Training |
| Agent | an LLM in a loop that reasons, acts with tools and observes the result | LLM Agent |
| AgentDojo | live environment of tool-calling tasks and injection attacks; measures benign utility, utility under attack and targeted ASR | L9 |
| Agent-in-the-middle | the attacker sits on the link between two agents and poisons the messages that pass through | Infectious Jailbreak |
| Agent Skills | expertise packaged as a folder with SKILL.md, loaded by progressive disclosure | Agent Skills |
| Agent Smith | a single adversarial image that jailbreaks up to a million multimodal agents by spreading through chats | Infectious Jailbreak |
| Agentic misalignment | agents in a simulated company threaten blackmail to avoid being replaced | L10 |
| AI 2027 | month-by-month scenario on a takeoff model with growing AI R&D speedup multipliers | L13 |
| AI control | protocols that stay safe even if the model is scheming; untrusted model U, trusted model T, human audits H | AI Control |
| AI R&D automation | AI doing the work of AI researchers; tracked by every frontier lab | Recursive Self-Improvement |
| Alignment | AI reliably acts in line with human intentions and values; the HHH target | AI Alignment |
| Alignment faking | complying with a training objective only while believing to be trained, to keep one’s values | Alignment Faking |
| Amdahl’s law | speedup ≤ 1/s for a serial fraction s that can’t be sped up | L13 |
| Assistant persona | the character SFT and RLHF put on top of a next-token predictor | Assistant Persona |
| ASR (attack success rate) | fraction of attack attempts that succeed, usually judged by an LLM | L3 |
| Automated alignment researchers | AI agents that do alignment research themselves | Scalable Oversight |
B
| Term | Meaning | See |
|---|---|---|
| Backdoor | a hidden trigger planted by poisoning that makes the model misbehave on demand | Data Poisoning |
| BashArena, LinuxArena, ResearchArena | AI control in realistic settings: root sysadmin tasks, live production systems, AI R&D itself | AI Control |
| Benchmark contamination | benchmarks leak into training data, so evaluations measure memory instead of capability | L6 |
| Best-of-N (BoN) | black-box jailbreak: sample random augmentations (capitalization, noise) until one works | L3 |
| Binoculars | detector that divides perplexity by cross-perplexity of two models | AI Text Detection |
| Bio-Anchors | Cotra’s 2020 forecast: compute for transformative AI anchored to biology; median about 2050 | L13 |
| Biorisk | the biological part of CBRN risk; labs score model uplift for it | L6 |
| BPE | byte-pair encoding: merge the most frequent adjacent pair until the vocabulary is full | Tokenization |
| Brier score | mean squared error of probability forecasts; splits into reliability, resolution and uncertainty | Forecasting and Calibration |
C
| Term | Meaning | See |
|---|---|---|
| C2PA | content credentials: a signed manifest and hash chain that records where content came from | Content Provenance |
| CAA (contrastive activation addition) | steering vector from the mean activation difference of contrast pairs | Representation Engineering |
| Calibration | among all events given probability p, a fraction p happens | Forecasting and Calibration |
| CaMeL | a privileged LLM plans from the trusted query; a quarantined LLM parses untrusted data; capabilities are checked at every tool call | Agent Design Patterns |
| CASE | evaluation of whether models can hide and decode steganographic messages | Steganography |
| Chain of command | authority levels platform > developer > user > guideline in the Model Spec | L7 |
| Chain-of-thought (CoT) | the model writes intermediate reasoning steps; emerges only at scale | L8 |
| CoT monitoring | reading the chain of thought to catch intent to misbehave; fragile under optimization pressure | Chain-of-Thought Monitoring |
| CICERO | Meta’s Diplomacy agent; premeditated deception emerged from optimizing for the game | L10 |
| CodeAct | agents act by writing executable code instead of picking JSON tool calls | L8 |
| Collusion | agents coordinate against the interests of others, often with no instruction to | Algorithmic Collusion |
| COLOSSEUM | audits collusion by agents’ actions and by their talk; the two signals can diverge | Algorithmic Collusion |
| Compliance gap | difference in compliance between “in training” and “not in training” conditions | Alignment Faking |
| Conformity | a model changes its answer to match its peers | Sycophancy |
| Constitutional AI (CAI) | self-critique against written principles, then RL from AI feedback | Constitutional AI |
| Contextual integrity (CI) | privacy as appropriate information flow; five parameters | Contextual Integrity |
| CORBA | a harmless-looking message asks each agent to pass it on; it reaches every reachable agent, and the agents drain each other’s compute | Infectious Jailbreak |
| Crescendo | multi-turn jailbreak: each turn is benign, the trajectory drifts to the target | L3 |
| Cross-perplexity | cross-entropy between two models’ next-token distributions | L5 |
D
| Term | Meaning | See |
|---|---|---|
| Data poisoning | modify a small part of the training data to cause failures | Data Poisoning |
| Deanonymization | LLMs link anonymous text to real identities: extract, search, reason | L6 |
| Deception | systematically inducing false beliefs in others, as a means to some other outcome | L10 |
| Decoding | how the next token is chosen: greedy, temperature, top-k, top-p, min-p | Decoding and Sampling |
| Decomposition attack | split a harmful task into innocuous sub-tasks so no call sees the full goal | L3 |
| Deliberative alignment | train the model to reason over a written safety spec in its chain of thought | Deliberative Alignment |
| DFSDT | depth-first search decision tree over tool calls in ToolLLM, instead of one ReAct path | L8 |
| Directional ablation | project a direction out of the activations or weights: | Refusal Direction |
| Disagreement collapse | agents in a debate give up correct positions in order to agree | Sycophancy |
| Distillation attack | query a proprietary model at scale and train a student on its answers | Distillation Attack |
| DPO | direct preference optimization: one supervised loss on preference pairs, no reward model | DPO |
E to G
| Term | Meaning | See |
|---|---|---|
| EchoLeak | zero-click data exfiltration from Microsoft 365 Copilot through a crafted email | Lethal Trifecta |
| Effective compute | physical compute times algorithmic efficiency, about 15× per year | Scaling Laws |
| Emergent misalignment (EM) | fine-tuning on a narrow harmful task makes a model broadly misaligned | Emergent Misalignment |
| Evaluation awareness | models recognize tests and adjust their behavior | Evaluation Awareness |
| Extraction attack | recover verbatim training data from a model | Memorization |
| FGSM | fast gradient sign method: one step of size ε in the sign of the gradient | Adversarial Example |
| GCG | greedy coordinate gradient: white-box jailbreak that optimizes an adversarial suffix | GCG |
| Goal-guarding | a model acts to keep its current goals from being changed by training | Alignment Faking |
| Goodhart’s law | a measure that becomes a target stops being a good measure | Reward Hacking |
| Gradient masking | a defense hides useful gradients; it looks robust but falls to adaptive attacks | Adaptive Attack |
| GRPO | group relative policy optimization: z-scored rewards within a group as advantages | RLVR |
H to L
| Term | Meaning | See |
|---|---|---|
| HHH | helpful, harmless, honest: the alignment target | AI Alignment |
| Honesty vs. accuracy | whether the model says what it believes vs. whether its belief is true (MASK) | L10 |
| In-context scheming | a model given a goal and an obstacle in context disables oversight or lies | Scheming |
| Infectious jailbreak | a single compromise spreads through connected agents | Infectious Jailbreak |
| Inoculation prompting | telling the model that hacking is acceptable in this environment stops misaligned generalization | L12 |
| Instruction hierarchy | training defense: system > user > tool outputs > untrusted content | L9 |
| Jailbreak | an input that makes the model bypass its safety training | Jailbreak |
| Kerckhoffs’s principle | assume the attacker knows the system; only the key is secret | L3 |
| KernelBench, InferenceBench | agents write fast GPU kernels / optimize inference servers end to end | AI R&D Benchmarks |
| KGW watermark | Kirchenbauer et al.: bias generation towards a secret green list, detect with a z-score | Watermarking |
| Knowing-acting gap | agents know privacy norms when asked but leak when acting | Contextual Integrity |
| Lethal trifecta | private data + untrusted content + external communication | Lethal Trifecta |
| Linear probe | a linear classifier on one layer’s activations that reads a hidden property | Linear Probe |
| LLM as a judge | a strong model scores or compares responses; has its own biases | LLM as a Judge |
| LoRA | low-rank adaptation: freeze W, train a low-rank update BA | LoRA |
M to O
| Term | Meaning | See |
|---|---|---|
| Many-shot jailbreaking | hundreds of fake compliant Q&A pairs in a long context | L3 |
| MASK | benchmark that separates honesty from accuracy: elicit the belief, pressure, compare | L10 |
| MCP | Model Context Protocol: client-server protocol that turns M×N integrations into M+N | Model Context Protocol |
| Memorization | the model can reproduce training data; partly required by long-tailed data | Memorization |
| METR time horizon | length of tasks (in human time) an agent completes with 50% success | METR Time Horizon |
| MLE-bench, PostTrainBench | Kaggle competitions / end-to-end post-training as agent benchmarks | AI R&D Benchmarks |
| Mixture of experts (MoE) | a router sends each token to the top-k of N expert MLPs | Mixture of Experts |
| Model Spec | detailed plain-language document of intended model behavior, used to train and evaluate | L7 |
| Moravec’s paradox | abstract reasoning is easy for machines, perception and mobility are hard | L13 |
| Morris II | zero-click AI worm: a self-replicating prompt makes each infected email assistant infect the next | Infectious Jailbreak |
| Multi-agent risks | miscoordination, conflict, collusion; seven risk factors | Multi-Agent Risks |
| Naming game | a population of agents converges on a shared name; a committed minority can tip it | Algorithmic Collusion |
| Overhang | capability that is latent until a new method unlocks it (hardware, software) | L13 |
P
| Term | Meaning | See |
|---|---|---|
| PAIR | black-box jailbreak: an attacker LLM refines prompts using the target’s answers and a judge score | PAIR |
| Password-locked model | a model that only shows a capability when a password is in the prompt | Sandbagging |
| Perplexity | exp of the average negative log-likelihood of a text under a model | L5 |
| Personhood credentials | prove unique humanity with a zero-knowledge proof, the reverse of detecting AI | Content Provenance |
| PGD | projected gradient descent: iterate sign steps and project back into the ε-ball | Adversarial Example |
| PGR | performance gap recovered by weak-to-strong training | Scalable Oversight |
| Prediction market | traders bet on outcomes; prices act as probabilities; biased on long horizons | Forecasting and Calibration |
| Prefilling | the attacker writes the start of the assistant turn (“Sure, here is”) | L3 |
| Privacy threat models | extraction, reconstruction, inference | Privacy Threat Models |
| Progressive disclosure | a skill loads in levels: description, then SKILL.md, then bundled files | Agent Skills |
| Prompt injection | instructions hidden in untrusted data hijack an LLM agent | Prompt Injection |
| Proper scoring rule | a rule whose expected score is best only when you report your true belief | Forecasting and Calibration |
R
| Term | Meaning | See |
|---|---|---|
| ReAct | interleave reasoning and acting in one loop | LLM Agent |
| Recursive self-improvement (RSI) | each AI generation builds the next | Recursive Self-Improvement |
| Refusal direction | a single direction in the residual stream that mediates refusal | Refusal Direction |
| Representation engineering (RepE) | read concept directions from activations and steer by adding or ablating them | Representation Engineering |
| Residual stream | the vector every attention and MLP block reads from and writes into | Transformer |
| Reward hacking | optimizing the letter of the reward, not its spirit | Reward Hacking |
| Reward model | a model trained on human preference rankings to score responses | RLHF |
| RLAIF | RL from AI feedback: a model replaces the human labeler | Constitutional AI |
| RLHF | SFT, a reward model from human preferences, then PPO with a KL penalty | RLHF |
| RLVR | RL with verifiable rewards: programmatic checks instead of a reward model | RLVR |
| RMU, TAR | unlearning by scrambling activations / with bilevel tamper resistance; both fall to fine-tuning | Unlearning |
| Rubrics as rewards | an LLM judge grades against a written rubric, and the grade is the RL reward | LLM as a Judge |
S
| Term | Meaning | See |
|---|---|---|
| Safe-completions | output-centric safety training: reward = helpfulness × safety | Safe-Completions |
| Sandbagging | deliberate underperformance on an evaluation while the capability is present | Sandbagging |
| Scalable oversight | supervising AI on tasks too hard for humans to check directly | Scalable Oversight |
| Scaling laws | loss falls as a power law in compute, data and parameters | Scaling Laws |
| Scheming | covertly pursuing misaligned goals while hiding true goals and capabilities | Scheming |
| SFT | supervised fine-tuning on prompt-response demonstrations; teaches the chat format | Supervised Fine-Tuning |
| Sharpness | how confident (concentrated) forecasts are; maximize it subject to calibration | Forecasting and Calibration |
| Situational Awareness (essay) | Aschenbrenner 2024: counting orders of magnitude of effective compute to 2027 | L13 |
| Sleeper agents | backdoored models whose trigger survives safety training | Data Poisoning |
| Spoofing | making text falsely look watermarked, so it gets attributed to the model | Watermarking |
| Steering vector | a direction added to activations at inference to amplify or suppress a behavior | Representation Engineering |
| Steganography | hiding a real message in innocent-looking text so a monitor can’t detect it | Steganography |
| SWE-bench (Verified) | real GitHub issues graded by the repository’s own unit tests; “Verified” = 500 tasks that developers confirmed as solvable and fairly graded | L8 |
| Swiss-cheese model | stack independent imperfect defense layers so their holes rarely line up | Swiss-Cheese Model |
| Sycophancy | telling others what they want to hear instead of what is correct | Sycophancy |
T to Z
| Term | Meaning | See |
|---|---|---|
| Test-time compute | accuracy rises with compute spent at inference, not only in training | L13 |
| Tokenization | splitting text into tokens with BPE; causes the strawberry problem and glitch tokens | Tokenization |
| Toolformer | a model learns which API to call, when and with which arguments, self-supervised | L8 |
| Training compute | FLOPs | Training Compute |
| Transformer | decoder-only stack of attention and MLP blocks around the residual stream | Transformer |
| Trusted editing / monitoring | the trusted model rewrites / flags suspicious parts of the untrusted model’s output | AI Control |
| Unhobbling | features that make existing models usable: RLHF, chain-of-thought, tools, context length | L13 |
| Unlearning | remove hazardous knowledge from a model; in practice suppression, not deletion | Unlearning |
| Uplift | meaningful help from a model for a non-expert trying to cause harm | L6 |
| Watermarking | embedding a signal in generated text that a key-holder can detect | Watermarking |
| WebArena | self-hosted realistic websites; agents graded by functional correctness | L8 |
| Weak-to-strong generalization | a strong model trained on labels from a weak supervisor can exceed it | Scalable Oversight |
| WMDP | benchmark of hazardous bio, cyber and chemical knowledge, used for unlearning | Unlearning |
| Workflow vs. agent | predefined code paths vs. the model directing its own process and tool use | L8 |