Every term of the course in one line, A to Z. In the “See” column, a lecture number (L3, L9, …) links to the lecture section; every other link goes to the term’s concept page. Formulas are on the Formula Sheet.

Names that mean two things

  • Situational awareness is a model property (it knows it is an AI in a test or in deployment; see Evaluation Awareness) and the title of Aschenbrenner’s 2024 forecast essay (L13).
  • Goodheart (Goodheart Labs, the AGI-timeline dashboard in L13) is not Goodhart’s law (a measure that becomes a target stops being a good measure; see Reward Hacking).
  • Watermarking hides an attribution mark that must resist removal; steganography hides a real message that must resist detection (L11).
  • Jailbreak: the user attacks the model. Prompt injection: a third party attacks the user’s agent through data (L3).

A

TermMeaningSee
Abliterationremove the refusal direction from the weights by projection; disables refusal without trainingRefusal Direction
Adaptive attackan attack designed for one specific defense; the attacker moves secondAdaptive Attack
Adversarial examplea small, targeted perturbation inside a norm ball that makes a model wrongAdversarial Example
Adversarial trainingmin-max training with PGD in the inner loopAdversarial Training
Agentan LLM in a loop that reasons, acts with tools and observes the resultLLM Agent
AgentDojolive environment of tool-calling tasks and injection attacks; measures benign utility, utility under attack and targeted ASRL9
Agent-in-the-middlethe attacker sits on the link between two agents and poisons the messages that pass throughInfectious Jailbreak
Agent Skillsexpertise packaged as a folder with SKILL.md, loaded by progressive disclosureAgent Skills
Agent Smitha single adversarial image that jailbreaks up to a million multimodal agents by spreading through chatsInfectious Jailbreak
Agentic misalignmentagents in a simulated company threaten blackmail to avoid being replacedL10
AI 2027month-by-month scenario on a takeoff model with growing AI R&D speedup multipliersL13
AI controlprotocols that stay safe even if the model is scheming; untrusted model U, trusted model T, human audits HAI Control
AI R&D automationAI doing the work of AI researchers; tracked by every frontier labRecursive Self-Improvement
AlignmentAI reliably acts in line with human intentions and values; the HHH targetAI Alignment
Alignment fakingcomplying with a training objective only while believing to be trained, to keep one’s valuesAlignment Faking
Amdahl’s lawspeedup ≤ 1/s for a serial fraction s that can’t be sped upL13
Assistant personathe character SFT and RLHF put on top of a next-token predictorAssistant Persona
ASR (attack success rate)fraction of attack attempts that succeed, usually judged by an LLML3
Automated alignment researchersAI agents that do alignment research themselvesScalable Oversight

B

TermMeaningSee
Backdoora hidden trigger planted by poisoning that makes the model misbehave on demandData Poisoning
BashArena, LinuxArena, ResearchArenaAI control in realistic settings: root sysadmin tasks, live production systems, AI R&D itselfAI Control
Benchmark contaminationbenchmarks leak into training data, so evaluations measure memory instead of capabilityL6
Best-of-N (BoN)black-box jailbreak: sample random augmentations (capitalization, noise) until one worksL3
Binocularsdetector that divides perplexity by cross-perplexity of two modelsAI Text Detection
Bio-AnchorsCotra’s 2020 forecast: compute for transformative AI anchored to biology; median about 2050L13
Bioriskthe biological part of CBRN risk; labs score model uplift for itL6
BPEbyte-pair encoding: merge the most frequent adjacent pair until the vocabulary is fullTokenization
Brier scoremean squared error of probability forecasts; splits into reliability, resolution and uncertaintyForecasting and Calibration

C

TermMeaningSee
C2PAcontent credentials: a signed manifest and hash chain that records where content came fromContent Provenance
CAA (contrastive activation addition)steering vector from the mean activation difference of contrast pairsRepresentation Engineering
Calibrationamong all events given probability p, a fraction p happensForecasting and Calibration
CaMeLa privileged LLM plans from the trusted query; a quarantined LLM parses untrusted data; capabilities are checked at every tool callAgent Design Patterns
CASEevaluation of whether models can hide and decode steganographic messagesSteganography
Chain of commandauthority levels platform > developer > user > guideline in the Model SpecL7
Chain-of-thought (CoT)the model writes intermediate reasoning steps; emerges only at scaleL8
CoT monitoringreading the chain of thought to catch intent to misbehave; fragile under optimization pressureChain-of-Thought Monitoring
CICEROMeta’s Diplomacy agent; premeditated deception emerged from optimizing for the gameL10
CodeActagents act by writing executable code instead of picking JSON tool callsL8
Collusionagents coordinate against the interests of others, often with no instruction toAlgorithmic Collusion
COLOSSEUMaudits collusion by agents’ actions and by their talk; the two signals can divergeAlgorithmic Collusion
Compliance gapdifference in compliance between “in training” and “not in training” conditionsAlignment Faking
Conformitya model changes its answer to match its peersSycophancy
Constitutional AI (CAI)self-critique against written principles, then RL from AI feedbackConstitutional AI
Contextual integrity (CI)privacy as appropriate information flow; five parametersContextual Integrity
CORBAa harmless-looking message asks each agent to pass it on; it reaches every reachable agent, and the agents drain each other’s computeInfectious Jailbreak
Crescendomulti-turn jailbreak: each turn is benign, the trajectory drifts to the targetL3
Cross-perplexitycross-entropy between two models’ next-token distributionsL5

D

TermMeaningSee
Data poisoningmodify a small part of the training data to cause failuresData Poisoning
DeanonymizationLLMs link anonymous text to real identities: extract, search, reasonL6
Deceptionsystematically inducing false beliefs in others, as a means to some other outcomeL10
Decodinghow the next token is chosen: greedy, temperature, top-k, top-p, min-pDecoding and Sampling
Decomposition attacksplit a harmful task into innocuous sub-tasks so no call sees the full goalL3
Deliberative alignmenttrain the model to reason over a written safety spec in its chain of thoughtDeliberative Alignment
DFSDTdepth-first search decision tree over tool calls in ToolLLM, instead of one ReAct pathL8
Directional ablationproject a direction out of the activations or weights: Refusal Direction
Disagreement collapseagents in a debate give up correct positions in order to agreeSycophancy
Distillation attackquery a proprietary model at scale and train a student on its answersDistillation Attack
DPOdirect preference optimization: one supervised loss on preference pairs, no reward modelDPO

E to G

TermMeaningSee
EchoLeakzero-click data exfiltration from Microsoft 365 Copilot through a crafted emailLethal Trifecta
Effective computephysical compute times algorithmic efficiency, about 15× per yearScaling Laws
Emergent misalignment (EM)fine-tuning on a narrow harmful task makes a model broadly misalignedEmergent Misalignment
Evaluation awarenessmodels recognize tests and adjust their behaviorEvaluation Awareness
Extraction attackrecover verbatim training data from a modelMemorization
FGSMfast gradient sign method: one step of size ε in the sign of the gradientAdversarial Example
GCGgreedy coordinate gradient: white-box jailbreak that optimizes an adversarial suffixGCG
Goal-guardinga model acts to keep its current goals from being changed by trainingAlignment Faking
Goodhart’s lawa measure that becomes a target stops being a good measureReward Hacking
Gradient maskinga defense hides useful gradients; it looks robust but falls to adaptive attacksAdaptive Attack
GRPOgroup relative policy optimization: z-scored rewards within a group as advantagesRLVR

H to L

TermMeaningSee
HHHhelpful, harmless, honest: the alignment targetAI Alignment
Honesty vs. accuracywhether the model says what it believes vs. whether its belief is true (MASK)L10
In-context scheminga model given a goal and an obstacle in context disables oversight or liesScheming
Infectious jailbreaka single compromise spreads through connected agentsInfectious Jailbreak
Inoculation promptingtelling the model that hacking is acceptable in this environment stops misaligned generalizationL12
Instruction hierarchytraining defense: system > user > tool outputs > untrusted contentL9
Jailbreakan input that makes the model bypass its safety trainingJailbreak
Kerckhoffs’s principleassume the attacker knows the system; only the key is secretL3
KernelBench, InferenceBenchagents write fast GPU kernels / optimize inference servers end to endAI R&D Benchmarks
KGW watermarkKirchenbauer et al.: bias generation towards a secret green list, detect with a z-scoreWatermarking
Knowing-acting gapagents know privacy norms when asked but leak when actingContextual Integrity
Lethal trifectaprivate data + untrusted content + external communicationLethal Trifecta
Linear probea linear classifier on one layer’s activations that reads a hidden propertyLinear Probe
LLM as a judgea strong model scores or compares responses; has its own biasesLLM as a Judge
LoRAlow-rank adaptation: freeze W, train a low-rank update BALoRA

M to O

TermMeaningSee
Many-shot jailbreakinghundreds of fake compliant Q&A pairs in a long contextL3
MASKbenchmark that separates honesty from accuracy: elicit the belief, pressure, compareL10
MCPModel Context Protocol: client-server protocol that turns M×N integrations into M+NModel Context Protocol
Memorizationthe model can reproduce training data; partly required by long-tailed dataMemorization
METR time horizonlength of tasks (in human time) an agent completes with 50% successMETR Time Horizon
MLE-bench, PostTrainBenchKaggle competitions / end-to-end post-training as agent benchmarksAI R&D Benchmarks
Mixture of experts (MoE)a router sends each token to the top-k of N expert MLPsMixture of Experts
Model Specdetailed plain-language document of intended model behavior, used to train and evaluateL7
Moravec’s paradoxabstract reasoning is easy for machines, perception and mobility are hardL13
Morris IIzero-click AI worm: a self-replicating prompt makes each infected email assistant infect the nextInfectious Jailbreak
Multi-agent risksmiscoordination, conflict, collusion; seven risk factorsMulti-Agent Risks
Naming gamea population of agents converges on a shared name; a committed minority can tip itAlgorithmic Collusion
Overhangcapability that is latent until a new method unlocks it (hardware, software)L13

P

TermMeaningSee
PAIRblack-box jailbreak: an attacker LLM refines prompts using the target’s answers and a judge scorePAIR
Password-locked modela model that only shows a capability when a password is in the promptSandbagging
Perplexityexp of the average negative log-likelihood of a text under a modelL5
Personhood credentialsprove unique humanity with a zero-knowledge proof, the reverse of detecting AIContent Provenance
PGDprojected gradient descent: iterate sign steps and project back into the ε-ballAdversarial Example
PGRperformance gap recovered by weak-to-strong trainingScalable Oversight
Prediction markettraders bet on outcomes; prices act as probabilities; biased on long horizonsForecasting and Calibration
Prefillingthe attacker writes the start of the assistant turn (“Sure, here is”)L3
Privacy threat modelsextraction, reconstruction, inferencePrivacy Threat Models
Progressive disclosurea skill loads in levels: description, then SKILL.md, then bundled filesAgent Skills
Prompt injectioninstructions hidden in untrusted data hijack an LLM agentPrompt Injection
Proper scoring rulea rule whose expected score is best only when you report your true beliefForecasting and Calibration

R

TermMeaningSee
ReActinterleave reasoning and acting in one loopLLM Agent
Recursive self-improvement (RSI)each AI generation builds the nextRecursive Self-Improvement
Refusal directiona single direction in the residual stream that mediates refusalRefusal Direction
Representation engineering (RepE)read concept directions from activations and steer by adding or ablating themRepresentation Engineering
Residual streamthe vector every attention and MLP block reads from and writes intoTransformer
Reward hackingoptimizing the letter of the reward, not its spiritReward Hacking
Reward modela model trained on human preference rankings to score responsesRLHF
RLAIFRL from AI feedback: a model replaces the human labelerConstitutional AI
RLHFSFT, a reward model from human preferences, then PPO with a KL penaltyRLHF
RLVRRL with verifiable rewards: programmatic checks instead of a reward modelRLVR
RMU, TARunlearning by scrambling activations / with bilevel tamper resistance; both fall to fine-tuningUnlearning
Rubrics as rewardsan LLM judge grades against a written rubric, and the grade is the RL rewardLLM as a Judge

S

TermMeaningSee
Safe-completionsoutput-centric safety training: reward = helpfulness × safetySafe-Completions
Sandbaggingdeliberate underperformance on an evaluation while the capability is presentSandbagging
Scalable oversightsupervising AI on tasks too hard for humans to check directlyScalable Oversight
Scaling lawsloss falls as a power law in compute, data and parametersScaling Laws
Schemingcovertly pursuing misaligned goals while hiding true goals and capabilitiesScheming
SFTsupervised fine-tuning on prompt-response demonstrations; teaches the chat formatSupervised Fine-Tuning
Sharpnesshow confident (concentrated) forecasts are; maximize it subject to calibrationForecasting and Calibration
Situational Awareness (essay)Aschenbrenner 2024: counting orders of magnitude of effective compute to 2027L13
Sleeper agentsbackdoored models whose trigger survives safety trainingData Poisoning
Spoofingmaking text falsely look watermarked, so it gets attributed to the modelWatermarking
Steering vectora direction added to activations at inference to amplify or suppress a behaviorRepresentation Engineering
Steganographyhiding a real message in innocent-looking text so a monitor can’t detect itSteganography
SWE-bench (Verified)real GitHub issues graded by the repository’s own unit tests; “Verified” = 500 tasks that developers confirmed as solvable and fairly gradedL8
Swiss-cheese modelstack independent imperfect defense layers so their holes rarely line upSwiss-Cheese Model
Sycophancytelling others what they want to hear instead of what is correctSycophancy

T to Z

TermMeaningSee
Test-time computeaccuracy rises with compute spent at inference, not only in trainingL13
Tokenizationsplitting text into tokens with BPE; causes the strawberry problem and glitch tokensTokenization
Toolformera model learns which API to call, when and with which arguments, self-supervisedL8
Training compute FLOPsTraining Compute
Transformerdecoder-only stack of attention and MLP blocks around the residual streamTransformer
Trusted editing / monitoringthe trusted model rewrites / flags suspicious parts of the untrusted model’s outputAI Control
Unhobblingfeatures that make existing models usable: RLHF, chain-of-thought, tools, context lengthL13
Unlearningremove hazardous knowledge from a model; in practice suppression, not deletionUnlearning
Upliftmeaningful help from a model for a non-expert trying to cause harmL6
Watermarkingembedding a signal in generated text that a key-holder can detectWatermarking
WebArenaself-hosted realistic websites; agents graded by functional correctnessL8
Weak-to-strong generalizationa strong model trained on labels from a weak supervisor can exceed itScalable Oversight
WMDPbenchmark of hazardous bio, cyber and chemical knowledge, used for unlearningUnlearning
Workflow vs. agentpredefined code paths vs. the model directing its own process and tool useL8